Perhaps the most explicit formulation of all is in the work of the anthropologist Sahlins, who holds that, for human beings, kinship is "mutuality of being." When indigenous people, for example, speak of being descended from a beaver, they are not speaking of what we consider a biological line of descent. According to Sahlins, chimpanzees have the sort of self, centered unequivocally in the body, which we usually think of as "human," but people actually have a far more fluid sense of self . The thinker who has done most to explore the practical implications of shared consciousness may be Porcher, who has argued that joy and sorrow pass, through intersubjectivity, between animals and the people who work and live alongside them, eventually impacting the entire society (Porcher, "Relationship"; Vivre; "'Work'") . All of these thinkers attempt to circumvent many of the conventional ways in which we divide experience into units of subjectivity from distinct individuals to species.
But, although they work from premises that are very similar to Marchesini's theory of zootropia, these thinkers go on to startlingly different practical conclusions. They are opposed to factory farming, mostly with great passion, but that is where their solidarity appears to end. From their common foundation, Shepherd derives a defense of hunting, while Porcher advocates traditional farming. Grandin takes what is conventionally called an "animal welfare" position, while Marchesini derives, in practice if not in theory, something like "animal rights" (Marchesini, Contro) . Haraway, Despret, Sahlins, and Deleuze and Guattari are mostly descriptive, and their recommendations are less easy to summarize.
What is one to make of these discrepancies? It may be that even such profound theorists are, with respect to human-animal relations, so caught up in their own experiences that they have difficulty recognizing those of others as authentic. At the very least, they all, including Marchesini, make several unstated assumptions.
My own view, which may be controversial, is that, contrary to what Marx and many others believed, philosophy cannot "change the world," at least not in any direct, linear way. There is, in other words, no unambiguous link between theory and praxis, and our relationships with animals are governed far more by intuition than by any doctrine. To know that somebody is, say, a Kantian, a Utilitarian, or a Deconstructionist tells us, in practice, nothing at all about what that person will do in a given situation. When it comes to practical and political issues, reconceptualizing the nature of the self is unlikely to settle anything. But how are we to explain the lack of even a comprehensive discussion of the practical and ethical dimensions of intersubjectivity among such philosophers? At present, we do not even have a widely accepted conceptual framework or vocabulary that would enable them to engage in such a conversation.
Marchesini's could prove an important step towards gaining recognition for shared consciousness across the human-animal divide in scholarly communities. His work is possibly the most ambitious, comprehensive attempt that we have to systematically unify these developments in anthrozoology. 1 He describes in detail the mechanism by which people construct their identity through identification with animals and other entities, and offers at least a provisional terminology for it. But to enable more probing discussion, he will need to find an idiom that is flexible and expressive enough to accommodate many points of view.
pre-cartesian humanism
Marchesini differs from many post-Humanists in that he does, even while placing human autonomy in question, seem to make an unequivocal distinction between human beings and animals. Other creatures are not incomplete or modified people, but they are bound to us precisely through their alterity. The closest correlate to this perspective may be pre-Cartesian or early Humanism, where there is not a very sharp division between subject and object. This is most easily apparent in regards to style. Like many philosophers and poets of the Renaissance, Marchesini writes in a manner that is often almost technical, yet pervaded by preface mysticism. It is intricate and systematic, yet at the same time very suggestive, and often filled with a sort of muted lyricism. It is fascinating, yet always a bit elusive, and often exists in a sort of twilight area between science and art. There is also an at times nearly ecstatic celebration of endless possibilities in his writing, which is rare among our contemporaries but common among pre-Cartesian Humanists. He comes across more as a Renaissance magus, seeking the truth within himself, than as a conventional scientist of the twenty-first century, taking part in a collective endeavor. Finally, like the early Humanists, he shows a preference for imagery that features fantastic composites of animals and human beings, as well as of similarly hybrid environments (Marchesini and Andersen; Aromatico) .
It is harder to say how much this stylistic similarity extends to content, since that may depend on nuances of meaning. It appears to be a result of convergence, rather than any direct or conscious influence. Marchesini himself has written in Epifania animale [Animal Epiphany] of Pico's Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), the manifesto that launched the Humanist movement, "The liberation of man from the theocentric oppression demanded a sacrificial victim in ontological terms," and that casualty was the animal, reduced to the status of "brute" and kept at a distance. He adds that this cosmocentric view expressed by Pico led inevitably to Cartesian dualism and, thus, to modern Humanism (Epifania 42). But this is taking in isolation a single facet of Pico's complex, multifaceted work ─ belief in a hierarchic order. Another aspect, developed by later figures such as Paracelsus and Leonardo da Vinci, was the idea of an organic cosmos.
Pico held that humans were wondrous and praiseworthy. This was not, however, because of any innate qualities or abilities that they possessed, but, to the contrary, due to a lack of them. Humans, according to Pico, were unencumbered by any distinctive nature, and therefore able to adopt that of other entities. He who "vegetates" becomes like a plant, while he who behaves "bestially" is an animal. But, through the use of reason, man can become divine like, and perhaps even more exalted than, the angels and archangels (Pico della Mirandola 11-14). Pico's exaltation of man, however, was at least partly a rhetorical defense against frequent suspicions of paganism and heresy. He was engaged in a syncretic revival of the old Chaldean, Persian, Greco-Roman, and, most importantly, Egyptian deities, many of which had hybrid or zoomorphic forms. Pico retained, of necessity, the cosmological imagery of the Middle Ages, but placed it in the service of a more pantheistic conception of God, a Deity that was immanent in the natural world.
Pico and his followers shared the late Medieval and Renaissance love of ambiguities, mysteries, and dialectical reversals. The idea of a human being as a microcosm, in many ways, moderated the collective arrogance of the claims made on behalf of humanity, as well as his own hubris, since it rendered human identity elusive almost to the point of disappearance. In addition, the special status of humanity was seemingly contradicted by Pico's view that all things in the cosmos possessed mind and soul (Ebeling 66) . A human, in other words, might be a microcosm, but so was everything else. The military harshness of the cosmic ranking was softened by the use of animal imagery to describe the esoteric ascent to Divinity.
For Humanists of the early Renaissance, the cosmos itself was an animal . Pico himself spoke of nurturing the divine part of one's soul as "feeding the cock" (Pico 22). For those in the tradition of Pico, Divine wisdom might be a dragon, sphinx, serpent, lamb, or other creature. The Evangelists Luke, Mark, and John were at times represented, on the model of the Egyptian deities, with the heads of animals. Hermes Trismegistus, whom Pico considered a sage comparable to Moses, was identified with the ibis-headed Egyptian god Thoth or, occasionally, the jackal-headed Greco-Egyptian god Hermanibus. The biblical story of the Golden Calf (Exodus 32), a version of the Egyptian Apis Bull, was, as traditionally interpreted, probably the bestknown parable against idolatry. Nevertheless, sax Pope Alexander VI, a defender of Pico, commissioned pictures by Pinturicchio depicting worship of the Apis Bull among the religious artworks in his apartments in the Vatican, for he considered the animal a predecessor of Christ .
A final feature that ties Marchesini to the early Humanists is a drive to create that constantly pushes boundaries. Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Giordano Bruno were all pious, devout Christians, yet they perpetually challenged the limits of orthodoxy, especially by attempting to incorporate Egyptian religion and other forms of paganism. The eventual martyrdom of Bruno, burned at the stake for advocating the heliocentric cosmos as a confirmation of Egyptian sun-worship, shows what they were up against. 2 In an analogous way, perhaps, Marchesini challenges what we think of as science. His work is scientific in the emphasis on precise, detailed description, yet it is almost entirely theoretical and has very little empirical content.
pushing the limits
Evidence for the theory of zootropia is very extensive yet circumstantial. An identity as "human" is indeed too amorphous to satisfy just about anyone. Most of us appear to crave a further differentiation in terms of ethnicity, gender, calling and so on, which, in turn, often goes back to associations with landscapes and animals. Animals are ubiquitous in the images that pertain to group identity, such as the heraldic arms of nations or the myths of origins.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the theory of zootropia could be either definitively falsified or confirmed. It has, so far as I am able to tell, virtually no predictive power. It may, in fact, be less a "theory" than a way of thinking about the world. But science itself has changed greatly over the centuries, gradually abandoning most of its early claims to absolute objectivity. In some ways, science may be more cyclical than linear, and perhaps a new "revolution" (understanding the word in a relatively literal way) may be returning us to foundations of the past.
Is hybrid identity itself a uniquely human characteristic, or is it perhaps shared by other creatures, at least to the extent that the term "identity" is applicable to their view of the world? And, if this is a uniquely human feature, when and how did it develop in human evolution? Is it necessarily characteristic of all human beings, or just a significant percentage? If indeed such an identity is characteristic of human beings today, can we anticipate that this will still be so in the indefinite future? The challenge, and much of the excitement, of such investigations is that they lead us to, and perhaps even beyond, the very limits of language, where all of our categories become precarious. This has always been the terrain of our most adventurous poets, cosmologists, and philosophers.
the study of human-animal relations Just as with organisms in an ecosystem, life can be pretty complicated for a scholar in academia who has not found a "niche." The study of human-animal relationships has been growing steadily in academia over the past several decades, but, for better or worse, it has never had a very cohesive foundation, and it seems to be fragmenting today. A decade or two ago, scholars often regarded "Anthrozoology" and "Animal Studies" as near synonyms, but they have drifted apart. Anthrozoology increasingly emphasizes quantitative methods, while Animal Studies remains based in traditional philosophy. Sub-disciplines such as post-Humanism and Critical Animal Studies endeavor to incorporate the high theory of the late twentieth century in the study of animals.
A strong anglophone bias persists in all of these areas, as researchers constantly invoke British, American, and Australian history and ideas. One of Marchesini's strengths lies in going beyond those sources, even while also drawing on them. A parallel discipline to anthrozoology, zooanthropologie, developed in preface France during the 1980s largely around the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss and is now, through the writings of Bruno Latour and Philippe Descola, beginning to have an impact in the anglophone world (Latour; Descola). Marchesini and his interlocutors have been active in developing the thinking and practice of zooantropologia in Italy since the 1990s, and as such their work is poised to make a larger impact in anglophone scholarship. But human-animal relations are now evolving at a rate far beyond the power of any academics to register, much less to analyze, in more than very general terms. Like software, our theoretical analyses start to become obsolete even before they are published.
The study of human-animal relations is now sufficiently enough of an academic discipline to offer rather comfortable niches to some people, but much of the most lively interesting work continues to be done on their fringes. This is, for the most part, where Marchesini has been situated, a location that has given him maximum freedom to develop his ideas, but shielded him from criticism as well. For a scholar who is content with very circumscribed aspirations can generally choose an established role, 3 but one whose scope is larger must develop it through interaction with peers. This is what Marchesini is now attempting, as he takes his work out of a purely Italian context, and the publication that you are reading is part of that endeavor.
In reaching out to an international public, Marchesini is likely to encounter difficult cultural barriers, even within Western nations. In the land of Virgil, Dante, and Michelangelo the past tends to overshadow, and even dominate, the present in ways that can be at once oppressive and inspiring, and which few Americans (or Australians or Canadians) can understand. The Italian engagement with the past, in consequence, takes on a greater intensity, whether for traditionalists, revolutionaries, or those who, like most of us, are a little of both. Many people throughout the world are trying to move beyond anthropocentrism, but anthropology strongly suggests that even casting aside our illusions of human superiority will not produce any utopia. When Marchesini describes this movement euphorically as "liberation," he strikes a note that seems to resonate in Italy, but elsewhere may appear anachronistic.
To my mind, there is something attractively old-fashioned about his systematization of research in human-animal relations, revealing, as it does, a sort of ambition that is more characteristic of the nineteenth century than of the twenty-first. It presupposes a sort of historical order in which eras are governed by dominant paradigms, articulated by seminal thinkers and separated by momentous events. But, with respect to animals, our era, like every other, has been a blend of many paradigms, none of which approaches being universal. 4 We have never been unequivocally anthropocentric.
Anachronistic or not, the format chosen by Marchesini enables him to add high drama to his study. It unfolds a bit like a Russian novel, perhaps Tolstoy's War and Peace. Here I must ask, with full sympathy, what just might be a painful but inevitable question, one which also comes up in respect to Pico della Mirandola. The Renaissance thinker was, as I have already noted, in many ways one of the least anthropocentric thinkers of his day, yet his legacy ultimately led to an anthropocentrism that went beyond anything before. Perhaps that quality lay less in his ideas than in his example, in the hubris running through his work. Unless we felt that human beings, ourselves very much included, are special indeed, how could we attach such momentous significance, for good or ill, to the work of a Descartes or a Nietzsche? Or a Marchesini?
William Faulkner believed that it was necessary for a great novel to fail, since the pathos lay in what was attempted. He repeatedly referred to his masterpiece, The Sound and the Fury, as his "most splendid failure" (Wolfe) . Something of the sort, arguably, might be said of Marchesini's works as well. As is probably the case with all of us, Marchesini's faults are tied closely to his virtues. Our task, fortunately, is not to judge but to learn and to enjoy, and his writing affords us plenty of opportunity for both. sax Marchesini, at his best, is a philosophical poet of human-animal relations. At times, he has an ability to look beyond convention, revealing startling, new perspectives. How his work will fit into the growing body of scholarship on human-animal relations is a drama that will unfold in the years to come. notes 1 This applies particularly to Roberto Marchesini's book Post-human: verso nuovi modelli di esistenza. In subsequent work, Marchesini has narrowed his scope, in order to focus more sharply on aspects of human-animal relations.
2 Copernicus also references Hermes Trismegistus on the sun as a deity in De revolutionibus orbius caelestium of 1543. The astronomer could have been inspired in part by Hermes, but may also have been aware that the association of his theory of the heliocentric universe with the Egyptian sage could invite charges of idolatry. See 68, 94, 3 This is what I believe that Marchesini may have been attempting with his book Fondamenti di zooanthropologia. Here, Marchesini's sheer scope conveys excitement. At the same time, at least outside of an Italian context, it is idiosyncratic. For all the learning that went into this book, many important thinkers, perspectives, and concerns are not addressed, while controversial ideas are accepted uncritically. Despite the fact that about a third of species are now threatened with extinction in the coming decades, there is, for example, almost nothing in the book about environmental problems.
